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Tappendorf and DiCanni: The Big Chill?

THE BIG CHILL? – THE LIKELY IMPACT OF KOONTZ ON
THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT/DEVELOPER RELATIONSHIP
Julie A. Tappendorf
Matthew T. DiCianni
The doctrine of unconstitutional conditions has come to be
regarded as an accepted and integral part of American constitutional
law.1 However, it currently finds itself at the center of a controversy
that may revolutionize the relationship between property owners, local governments, and the federal judiciary. This controversy involves
development exactions, a rapidly changing area of property law that
has been the subject of several landmark Supreme Court decisions
over the past three decades.2 Once a relatively unknown tool used by
a handful of local governments,3 exactions, in many ways, now define the relationship between property owners and local govern
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1
See Mitchell N. Berman, Coercion Without Baselines: Unconstitutional Conditions in
Three Dimensions, 90 GEO. L.J. 1, 3 (2001) (stating that the doctrine of unconstitutional
conditions “has been recognized for well over a century and appears in dozens of doctrinal
contexts.”).
2
See Timothy M. Mulvaney, Proposed Exactions, 26 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 277, 278
(2011) (discussing how the Supreme Court’s exactions jurisprudence has developed over the
past three decades).
3
See Timothy M. Mulvaney, Exactions for the Future, 64 BAYLOR L. REV. 511, 516, 518
(2012) (stating that “leading up to the Great Depression, subdividing land required only a
whim, a pen, and a map. . . . large landholders bore no responsibility for constructing public
improvements needed to serve these subdivided lands.”).
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ments.4 This relationship took an abrupt turn at the end of the Supreme Court’s 2012 term when it decided Koontz v. St. Johns River
Water Management District.5 This case, hailed as a major victory for
developers and a setback for communities across the country,6 placed
the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions into the center of controversy.
This article will explore the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions, showing how it has evolved in the context of land use and
come to be the logical underpinning of controversial Supreme Court
decisions regarding exactions. Part I will explain the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions, providing a brief overview of its development over the course of the past century. Part II will then discuss
how this doctrine has come to be the logical foundation on which the
Supreme Court’s exactions jurisprudence rests. Part III will discuss
the Koontz decision and its impact on the doctrine of unconstitutional
conditions. In Part IV, we will shift our focus to the Koontz decision,
and explain why it has been called by some commentators the worst
takings decision in Supreme Court history. Finally, in Part V, we
will discuss how local governments should proceed in the postKoontz world.
I.

WHAT IS THE DOCTRINE OF UNCONSTITUTIONAL
CONDITIONS?

The doctrine of unconstitutional conditions, first articulated
by the Lochner Court over a century ago,7 holds that the government
may not condition the provision of a discretionary benefit (e.g., a
permit, license, grant, contract, etc.) on a requirement that an individual surrender a constitutionally protected right.8 For example, the
4

Mark Fenster, Regulating Land Use in A Constitutional Shadow: The Institutional Contexts of Exactions, 58 HASTINGS L.J. 729, 741 (2007).
5
133 S. Ct. 2586 (2013).
6
See Jonathan Stempel & Lawrence Hurley, U.S. top court backs Florida property owner
in land-use case, REUTERS (June 25, 2013, 4:00 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/0
6/25/us-usa-court-property-idUSBRE95O0XM20130625 (stating “[i]n a victory for advocates of private property rights, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled on Tuesday that governments
may owe compensation to property owners who are denied permits to develop their land.”).
7
See W. Union Tel. Co. v. Kansas ex rel. Coleman, 216 U.S. 1, 51 (1910); Pullman Co. v.
Kansas ex rel. Coleman, 216 U.S. 56, 70 (1910) (demonstrating the Supreme Court’s first
use of the term “unconstitutional condition” in these cases decided in January 1910).
8
Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2595 (explaining that “the unconstitutional conditions doctrine for-

https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol30/iss2/14

2

Tappendorf and DiCanni: The Big Chill?

2014]

THE BIG CHILL?

457

government cannot force a television station receiving public funds to
refrain from endorsing a candidate for public office9 because then the
constitutionally protected right (freedom of speech) would be impermissibly burdened by the government’s refusal to provide public
funds to the television station. The doctrine applies even if the government is authorized to withhold the benefit altogether. 10 This doctrine is a reflection of the view that the government “may not do indirectly what it cannot do directly.”11
There is a continuum of the degree to which a “benefit” is a
discretionary gift of the government, and when it is a constitutionally
protected right. For example, welfare is a discretionary benefit that
the government is under no legal right to provide.12 The right to develop property, on the other hand, is a constitutionally protected
right,13 albeit one that can be regulated.14 Therefore, the degree to
which a benefit is a fundamental right rather than an optional gift
provided by the government dictates the degree to which the doctrine
of unconstitutional conditions may be applied.15 The more the condition restricted is a fundamental right, the less the government may
burden it. The doctrine of unconstitutional conditions has survived a
number of ideological shifts on the Court16 and has become an acbids burdening the Constitution’s enumerated rights by coercively withholding benefits from
those who exercise them.”).
9
See FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364, 381-82 (1984) (holding that Congress may not require a public television station to refrain from engaging in editorializing as
a condition for receiving public funds).
10
Woodard v. Ohio Adult Parole Auth., 107 F.3d 1178, 1189 (6th Cir. 1997).
11
Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1413, 1415
(1989).
12
See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 263 (1970) (explaining that once the decision to
provide welfare benefits has been made, the government may not deny the benefits for unfair
reasons or through unfair procedures); see also Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 399, 410
(1963) (finding that a state may not refuse to pay unemployment benefits to a Seventh Day
Adventist who rejects a job that requires her to work on Saturdays).
13
Spence v. Zimmerman, 873 F.2d 256, 258 (11th Cir. 1989).
14
Norman v. United States, 63 Fed. Cl. 231, 266 (Fed. Cl. 2004) (stating “simply because
a private property owner is in a highly-regulated field, does not, by itself, mean that the
owner has no reasonable investment-backed expectations in its ability to develop or otherwise utilize its property.”).
15
James S. Burling & Graham Owen, The Implications of Lingle on Inclusionary Zoning
and Other Legislative and Monetary Exactions, 28 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 397, 411 (2009).
16
See Cass R. Sunstein, Why the Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine Is an Anachronism (with Particular Reference to Religion, Speech, and Abortion), 70 B.U. L. REV. 593,
596 (1990) (recognizing that the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions survived the radical
changes of the New Deal, and reemerged under the Warren Court to protect personal liber-
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cepted and essential aspect of American constitutional law.
II.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE UNCONSTITUTIONAL
CONDITIONS DOCTRINE IN LAND USE LAW: NOLLAN,
DOLAN, AND LINGLE

While the Supreme Court continued to expand the doctrine of
unconstitutional conditions throughout the twentieth century, it was
not until the 1980s that it applied the doctrine to land use. Since that
time, the unconstitutional conditions doctrine has become one of the
hottest areas of property law,17 providing the logical underpinning for
the Court’s exactions jurisprudence, which has redefined the relationship between local governments and property owners.
An exaction is a condition placed on land by the government18
that requires a property owner seeking to develop his property to mitigate the negative impacts of the owner’s proposed development.19
This often requires the developer to dedicate land for streets, sidewalks, or parks, or to pay money to offset the government’s cost of
providing infrastructure like sewers, water pipes, and garbage collection.20 The use of exactions increased substantially during the 1970s
and 1980s,21 and local governments increasingly demanded greater
concessions from developers, which often bore little relationship to

ties); see, e.g., Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347 (1976); Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563
(1968); Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958).
17
See Carlos A. Ball & Laurie Reynolds, Exactions and Burden Distribution in Takings
Law, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1513, 1513 (2006) (“In the last several decades, there has
been a marked shift in local government financing away from the use of general revenue
taxes and toward nontax revenue-raising devices such as exactions.”).
18
Usually a local government imposes an exaction.
19
See Kamaole Pointe Dev. LP v. Cnty. of Maui, 573 F. Supp. 2d 1354, 1369 (D. Haw.
2008); see generally DAVID L. CALLIES, CECILY TALBERT BARCLAY & JULIE A. TAPPENDORF,
DEVELOPMENT BY AGREEMENT: A TOOL KIT FOR LAND DEVELOPERS AND LOCAL
GOVERNMENTS (2012) (providing a general discussion of development exactions).
20
These fees are known as monetary exactions.
21
The use of exactions increased in the 1970s because municipal governments were increasingly strained financially due to the burgeoning anti-tax movement, the rise of the antigrowth movement, a reduction in federal contributions to local communities, and increased
state and federal mandates requiring municipalities to increase their services. See Mulvaney,
Exactions for the Future, supra note 3, at 518 (“In the face of federal and state funding cuts
to local governments in the 1970s and 1980s, developer-borne exactions looked more and
more like an attractive option to the public and its elected representatives . . . .”); see also
Ball & Reynolds, supra note 17, at 1524-28 (explaining the growth of exactions through the
20th century).
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the negative impacts of the development.22 This attracted the attention of the Supreme Court, and in 1987, the Court began to develop
its exactions jurisprudence in Nollan v. California Coastal Commission.23
A.

Nollan v. California Coastal Commission

In Nollan, the plaintiffs sought to demolish their beachside
house and replace it with a larger one.24 The California Coastal
Commission agreed to these plans on the condition that the plaintiffs
grant the public an easement across the beachfront portion of their
property.25 The Commission justified this easement on the basis that
“the new house would increase blockage of the view of the ocean,”26
and would “burden the public’s ability to traverse to and along the
shorefront.”27 The plaintiffs appealed this decision in state courts to
no avail, but were able to obtain a writ of certiorari from the United
States Supreme Court.
The issue before the Supreme Court was whether the Takings
Clause permitted the government to require an uncompensated conveyance from a property owner as a condition for a land use permit
when the government otherwise would not be able to require this
conveyance without paying just compensation.28 The Court’s answer
was no, unless the government could show that the condition “substantially advance[s] legitimate state interests” and the condition did
not “den[y] an owner economically viable use of his land.”29 For
purposes of the case, the Court assumed that the condition met this
threshold requirement.30 It then focused on the lack of congruence
between the easement demanded and the purposes articulated by the
22

See Ronald H. Rosenberg, The Changing Culture of American Land Use Regulation:
Paying for Growth with Impact Fees, 59 SMU L. REV. 177, 201 (2006).
23
483 U.S. 825 (1987).
24
Id. at 828.
25
Id. at 829.
26
Id. at 828.
27
Id. at 829.
28
Nollan, 483 U.S. at 834.
29
Id. (alteration in original) (citing Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980)). The
Court did not specifically state what would constitute substantially advancing state interests,
but that a broad range of purposes and regulations would satisfy these requirements. Agins,
447 U.S. at 260-61.
30
Nollan, 483 U.S. at 836.
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commission.31 The Court noted that the “lack of nexus between the
[building] condition and the original purpose of the building restriction”32 was critical because “unless the permit condition serves
the same governmental purpose as [a] development ban, the building
restriction is not a valid regulation of land use but an ‘out-and-out
plan of extortion.’ ”33 Nollan, thus, established that an “essential
nexus” must exist between a development condition and the amelioration of a legitimate public problem arising from the development.34
While this holding essentially stated that the right to develop property
could not be impermissibly burdened by the government except in
limited circumstances, conspicuously absent from the Court’s language was any mention of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine.
The Court clarified this absence in another landmark property rights
case, Dolan v. City of Tigard.35
B.

Dolan v. City of Tigard

In Dolan, the plaintiff sought to redevelop her property, and
as a condition of this redevelopment, the city required her to build a
walk/bike path that would extend across fifteen percent of her property.36 The plaintiff contested this condition,37 but lost at all state court
levels.38 The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari, and
expanded and clarified its holding in Nollan. The Court explained
that its holding in Nollan was an application of the unconstitutional
conditions doctrine.39 When the government imposes an exaction, it
burdens the property owner’s right to receive just compensation for
the taking of property.40 The Court held that the government may not
burden this right except in limited circumstances. Specifically, in order to impose an exaction, the government needed to show two
things: 1) there must be an “essential nexus” between the exaction
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40

Id. at 837-39.
Id. at 837.
Id.
Id.
512 U.S. 374 (1994).
Id. at 377-80.
Id. at 381.
Id. at 382-83.
Id. at 385.
Dolan, 512 U.S. at 385.
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and a legitimate state interest;41 and 2) there must be a “rough proportionality” between this state interest and the exaction.42 If the government could not meet both of these conditions, then it impermissibly burdened the property owner’s right to development, and the
exaction was unconstitutional.43 In Dolan, the Court found that the
second condition had not been satisfied, as the city did not prove that
the proposed walk/bike path was necessary to offset the increased
traffic caused by the development.
Nollan and Dolan, thus, created a framework that allowed local governments to continue to impose exactions but made it easier
for a property owner to assert a takings claim.44
C.

Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc.

In 2005, the Supreme Court further elevated the importance of
the unconstitutional conditions doctrine in Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A.,
Inc.45 In Lingle, the State of Hawai’i enacted a statute that limited the
amount of rent an oil company could charge a dealer. 46 The plaintiff,
an oil company, sued the state, claiming that the statute effectuated a
taking of its property.47 The district court granted summary judgment
for the plaintiff, holding that the statute “fail[ed] to substantially advance a legitimate state interest, and as such, effect[ed] an unconstitutional taking.”48 The district court came to this holding by relying
upon language in Nollan, Dolan, and Agins that seemed to require
that a valid taking “substantially advance” a legitimate state inter-

41

Id. at 386. The Court devised the “essential nexus” requirement in Nollan, 483 U.S. at

837.
42

See Dolan, 512 U.S. at 391 (explaining that to determine rough proportionality, “[n]o
precise mathematical calculation is required, but the city must make some sort of individualized determination that the required dedication is related both in nature and extent to the impact of the proposed development.”).
43
Id. at 391.
44
The Court has allowed property rights to be burdened to a greater extent than other constitutional rights. For example, the First Amendment would probably apply to a government
policy that refused to allow permits to hold worship services in a church unless the parishioners agreed to perform repair work on government property several miles away.
45
544 U.S. 528 (2005).
46
Id. at 533.
47
Id.
48
Id. at 534 (quoting Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Cayetano, 57 F. Supp. 2d 1003, 1014 (D.
Haw. 1998)).
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est.49 The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s holding and its
reliance upon this “substantially advance” language.50
However, the Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit, rebuking its reliance on the “substantially advance” language. 51 The
Court unanimously held that despite statements it made in Nollan and
Dolan, a court should not review whether the government’s action
substantially advances a legitimate state interest.52 The Court explained that the legitimacy of governmental action is not a proper takings inquiry, as “the Takings Clause presupposes that the government
has acted in pursuit of a valid public purpose.”53 The “substantially
advance” language, on the other hand, improperly focuses on the policy supporting the regulation,54 and not the essential takings question:
whether a regulation is “functionally comparable to government appropriation or invasion of private property.”55 The Court held that
the constitutional underpinning of Nollan and Dolan is the unconstitutional conditions doctrine,56 while it is the Due Process Clause for
the “substantially advance” test.57 By repudiating the “substantially
advances” language, Lingle broadened the rights of local governments to regulate land use, as the court would no longer inquire into
the reasonableness of government action. This decision clarified the
Court’s exactions jurisprudence, but left one crucial question unresolved: Did Nollan and Dolan apply to monetary exactions? The
Court resolved this question in Koontz.
III.

KOONTZ: A REVOLUTION IN LAND USE LAW?

Koontz v. St. Johns Water Management District was decided
at the end of the Supreme Court’s 2012 term58 and was somewhat
overshadowed by other landmark cases involving the validity of the

49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58

Id. at 531-32.
Lingle, 544 U.S. at 536.
Id. at 545.
Id. at 542-45.
Id. at 543.
Id. at 542.
Lingle, 544 U.S. at 542.
Id. at 547-48.
Id. at 540.
Koontz, 133 S. Ct. 2586. The case was decided on June 25, 2013.
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preclearance provisions of the Voting Rights Act,59 the use of race in
school admissions,60 and historic rulings on same-sex marriage.61
While Koontz may not have received as much fanfare as those cases,
it has potentially wider ranger implications.
The case involved Coy A. Koontz, an owner of a 14.9-acre
tract of Florida wetlands, who sought a permit from the St. Johns
River Water Management District (“District”) to develop a 3.7 acre
portion of his land.62 As a condition to this development, Koontz
proposed giving “the District a conservation easement on [a] portion
of his property.”63 The District rejected this initial proposal and
countered with a proposal asking Koontz to either dedicate a larger
conservation easement or hire contractors to improve another part of
the District’s property.64 After receiving this counteroffer, Koontz
dropped out of the negotiations and sued the District under a state law
permitting property owners to recover money damages in the event of
an unconstitutional taking.65 Koontz argued that the District’s demands failed to meet the “essential nexus” and “rough proportionality” standards established in Nollan and Dolan.66 The trial and appellate courts held that the District’s demand failed the Nollan/Dolan
tests and, therefore, constituted a taking.67 The Florida Supreme
Court reversed, holding that Koontz did not have a claim for two reasons.68 First, the court held that the Nollan/Dolan standard does not
apply to the denial of a permit (as opposed to the approval). 69 Second, the court held that the Nollan/Dolan standard does not apply to a
demand for the payment of money (a monetary exaction) and instead

59

Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013).
Fisher v. Univ. of Texas, 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013).
61
United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013); Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct.
2652 (2013).
62
Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2591-93.
63
Id. at 2592-93.
64
Id. at 2593.
65
Id. (indicating that Koontz “argued that he was entitled to relief under FLA. STAT. §
373.617(2), which allows owners to recover ‘monetary damages’ if a state agency’s action is
‘an unreasonable exercise of the state’s police power constituting a taking without just compensation.’ ”).
66
Id. at 2595-96.
67
Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2593.
68
Id.
69
Id.; see also St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist. v. Koontz, 77 So. 3d 1220, 1230 (Fla.
2011).
60
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only applies to a specific burden on a property interest.70
The Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed the Florida
Supreme Court on both grounds.71 First, the Court unanimously held
that the Nollan/Dolan standard does apply to the denial of a permit,
and that Koontz could assert “a Nollan/Dolan unconstitutional conditions violation.”72 The Justices agreed that refusing to grant a development permit unless a property owner agreed to an unconstitutional
condition was no different from granting the development permit on
the condition that the property owner relinquish his constitutional
right to just compensation.73 The Court noted that “[u]nder Nollan
and Dolan the government may choose whether and how a permit
applicant is required to mitigate the impacts of a proposed development, but it may not leverage its legitimate interest in mitigation to
pursue governmental ends that lack an essential nexus and rough proportionality to those impacts.”74
Addressing the argument that Koontz had lost no property
and, therefore, could not assert a takings claim, the majority held that
Koontz had indeed suffered a constitutional injury.75 This injury was
not that the government took property without just compensation, but
rather that by its making an “extortionate demand” on Koontz, it
“impermissibly burden[ed] the right not to have property taken without just compensation.”76 Thus, the government’s action ran afoul of
the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions. This would have been
true even if the benefit was one that the government “would have
been entirely within its rights in denying.”77 The Court recognized
that “land-use permit applicants are especially vulnerable to the type
of coercion that the unconstitutional conditions doctrine prohibits because the government often has broad discretion to deny a permit that
is worth far more than the property it would like to take.”78 This
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78

Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2594; St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 77 So. 3d at 1230.
Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2594.
Id. at 2594-97.
Id. at 2595.
Id.
Id. at 2596.
Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2596.
Id.
Id. at 2594. The Court explained:
Our decisions in [Nollan/Dolan] reflect two realities of the permitting
process. The first is that land-use permit applicants are especially vul-
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could easily “pressure an owner into voluntarily giving up property
for which the Fifth Amendment would otherwise require just compensation,”79 and, therefore, required that the heightened standards of
Nollan/Dolan be applied to government rejection of a land use permit.
The second part of the Court’s holding bitterly divided it 5-4
along ideological lines. The Court held that a government’s demand
for money from a land use permit applicant, known as a monetary
exaction, must satisfy the Nollan/Dolan requirements.80 The majority
explained that holding otherwise would allow the government to
evade Nollan/Dolan by simply imposing monetary exactions on a
property owner instead of requiring him to surrender property.81
However, the majority noted that taxes are not takings, and therefore
not subject to the Nollan/Dolan requirements.82 It dismissed the argument that the difficulty in distinguishing monetary exactions from
taxes might lead to judicial review of all fees imposed by a municipality, writing that “teasing out the difference between taxes and takings is more difficult in theory than in practice.”83 The Court then
remanded the case to the Florida Supreme Court to determine whether the District’s rejection of the land use permit was a Nollan/Dolan
violation.84
Justice Kagan, writing for the dissent, proclaimed that the
Court would come to “rue” its decision.85 First, Kagan noted that in
Eastern Enterprises v. Apfel,86 the Court held that “requiring a person
nerable to the type of coercion that the unconstitutional conditions doctrine prohibits because the government often has broad discretion to deny a permit that is worth far more than the property it would like to take.
By conditioning a building permit on the owner’s deeding over a public
right-of-way, for example, the government can pressure an owner into
voluntarily giving up property for which the Fifth Amendment would
otherwise require just compensation. . . . Extortionate demands of this
sort frustrate the Fifth Amendment right to just compensation, and the
unconstitutional conditions doctrine prohibits them.
Id. at 2594-95.
79
Id. at 2594.
80
Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2598-2602.
81
Id. at 2595.
82
Id. at 2600.
83
Id. at 2601.
84
Id. at 2603.
85
Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2612 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
86
524 U.S. 498 (1998).
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to pay money to the government, or spend money on its behalf, [does
not] constitute a taking.”87 Rather, a taking only occurs when the
government impairs a “specific and identified propert[y] or property
right.”88 Under this standard, a monetary exaction could never be a
taking. However, she explained that Nollan/Dolan only applies when
the government has effectuated a taking.89 Therefore, Koontz’s subjection of monetary exactions to the Nollan/Dolan requirements was
inconsistent with Eastern Enterprises. Justice Kagan blasted the majority for “run[ning] roughshod over Eastern Enterprises.”90
Second, Kagan worried that the majority’s holding “threatens
to subject a vast array of land-use regulations, applied daily in States
and localities throughout the country, to heightened constitutional
scrutiny.”91 She was particularly concerned about the ability of lower
courts to distinguish monetary exactions, held to the higher Nollan/Dolan standard, from taxes, not held to this standard.92 Kagan
noted that “[t]he boundaries of the majority’s new rule are uncertain.”93
Third, Justice Kagan challenged the majority’s factual findings. She argued that the government never made a demand on
Koontz.94 Rather, it merely engaged in a process of negotiation, suggesting ways Koontz could mitigate the negative effects of his development.95 Kagan noted that Nollan/Dolan does not apply to excessive regulatory burdens on land use, but instead prevents the
government from imposing the unconstitutional condition that a
property owner surrender his right to “just compensation ‘in exchange for a discretionary benefit’ having ‘little or no relationship’ to
the property taken.”96 “[Therefore], the Nollan/Dolan test only applies when the property the government demands . . . is the kind [for

87

Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2605 (Kagan, J., dissenting); E. Enters., 524 U.S. at 543 (Kennedy, J., concurring and dissenting in part).
88
Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2605 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (alteration in original); E. Enters.,
524 U.S. at 540-41 (Kennedy, J., concurring and dissenting in part).
89
Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2606 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
90
Id. at 2603.
91
Id. at 2604.
92
Id. at 2607-08.
93
Id. at 2604.
94
Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2604 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
95
Id. at 2611.
96
Id. at 2604-05 (citing Lingle, 544 U.S. at 547).
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which] it otherwise would have to pay. . . .”97 If the government never makes a demand, no taking could occur.98 Therefore, according to
Justice Kagan, Koontz had no claim.99
Fourth, Justice Kagan argued that challenges to monetary exactions should be evaluated under the Penn Central regulatory takings framework or as a violation of another constitutional provision,
like the Due Process Clause.100 As noted above, she explained that
Nollan/Dolan only applies when the government imposes an exaction
for which it otherwise would have to pay just compensation.101 As a
result, the Takings Clause is not the appropriate constitutional provision to apply to monetary exactions.
IV.

KOONTZ: THE WORST TAKINGS DECISION OF ALL TIME?

While the reception to the Koontz decision was initially
mixed, the decision has engendered an increasingly critical response.103 Scholars question the legal foundation on which it rests,
developers worry about the chilling effects it will have on negotiations with local governments, and local governments worry about the
lawsuits they will face from developers. Cumulatively, these issues
102

97

Id. at 2605.
Id. at 2604.
99
Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2604 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
100
Id. at 2609. Kagan argues that “a court can use the Penn Central framework, the Due
Process Clause, and (in many places) state law to protect against monetary demands . . . .”
Id.
101
Id.
102
A number of commentators praised the decision in the days after it was issued. See
Larry Salzman, Koontz Decision: Victory for Property Rights, NAT’L REV. ONLINE (June 25,
2013, 5:45 PM), http://www.nationalreview.com/corner/352016/koontz-decision-victoryproperty-rights-larry-salzman; Paul J. Beard II, Ruling Protects Landowners But Won’t Hurt
‘Collaboration’,
THE SACRAMENTO BEE
(July
10,
2013,
12:00
AM),
http://www.sacbee.com/.
2013/07/10/5556066/ruling-protects-landowners-but.html. However, the decision was also
criticized. John D. Echeverria, A Legal Blow to Sustainable Development, N.Y. TIMES (June
26, 2013, 12:00 AM), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/27/opinion/a-legal-blow-tosustainable-development.html?ref=opinion&_r=1&.
103
See John D. Echeverria, Koontz: The Very Worst Takings Decision Ever?, VT. L. SCH.
PAPER (Aug. 26, 2013), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2316406; Adam Lovelady, The Koontz Decision and Implications for Development Exactions, COATES’ CANONS BLOG (July 1, 2013),
http://canons.sog.unc.edu; Potential Impacts of Koontz Decision on Local Land Use Decisions, CMAP (Aug. 5, 2013), http://www.cmap.illinois.gov/about/updates/-/asset_publisher
/UIMfSLnFfMB6/content/potential-impacts-of-koontz-decision-on-local-land-use-decisions.
98
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might make Koontz the Supreme Court’s worst takings decision of all
time.
A.

Koontz Rests on a Shaky Legal Foundation

One major problem with the Court’s decision in Koontz is the
shaky legal foundation upon which it rests. The Court ignored past
precedent and created an amorphous, ill-defined legal standard that
lower courts will have difficulty applying. First, as Justice Kagan
notes in her dissent, the majority’s holding in Koontz “runs roughshod over Eastern Enterprises.”104 In that case, the Court held that
requiring an individual to pay money to the government or spend
money on its behalf did not constitute a taking to which the Nollan/Dolan requirements would apply.105 This would seem to encompass monetary exactions. However, the majority in Koontz does not
address the inconsistency between its holding and Eastern Enterprises. Its failure to resolve the discrepancy between these cases creates
uncertainty as to when monetary exactions apply, and how Eastern
Enterprises fits into the takings analysis.
Second, Koontz contradicts the Court’s holding in City of
Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd.106 In that case, a
unanimous Court held that Dolan’s rough proportionality test does
not apply to permit denials.107 The Court stated:
Dolan considers whether dedications demanded as
conditions of development are proportional to the development’s anticipated impacts. It was not designed
to address, and is not readily applicable to, the much
different questions arising where, as here, the landowner’s challenge is based not on excessive exactions
but on denial of development.108
Koontz squarely contradicts this statement by applying the Dolan
rough proportionality test to permit denials.109 Amazingly, the majority makes no mention of City of Monterey and leaves us wondering
104
105
106
107
108
109

Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2603 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
E. Enters., 524 U.S. at 540 (Kennedy, J., concurring and dissenting in part).
526 U.S. 687 (1999).
Id. at 703.
Id.
Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2594-95.
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how to resolve the inconsistencies between these cases.
While Koontz rides roughshod over established Supreme
Court precedent, it leaves in its wake a murky legal standard that
lower courts will find difficult to apply. This murkiness will be most
clear when a lower court attempts to determine when a permit denial
should be held to the Nollan/Dolan requirements. Koontz held that
the Nollan/Dolan requirements will be triggered when a local government makes a demand on a permit applicant.110 However, what
constitutes a demand? Koontz gives no guidance. The majority
merely states in conclusory fashion that the District made a demand
on Koontz.111 It does not explain why the District made a demand
and not merely a proposal, or give any guidance for lower courts to
distinguish between the two. Justice Kagan struggles to find the line
between them, and ultimately comes to an opposite conclusion from
the majority, finding that the District merely made proposals, and not
demands, on Koontz.112 The absence of any framework by which to
distinguish a demand from a proposal means that lower courts will
create their own framework, leading to a haphazard application of
Koontz throughout the country. Justice Kagan fears the consequences
of the murky line between a demand and a proposal, writing that
“[the] danger would rise exponentially if something less than a clear
condition . . . triggered Nollan/Dolan scrutiny.”113
This murky line between a demand and a proposal is further
complicated by the realities of the permitting process. Negotiations
between developers and local government often consist of informal
conversations and mutual understandings not documented in formal
letters or contracts. Several exaction options may be discussed, none
of which were clearly defined or identified. How does either side
prove whether an unconstitutional demand was made? It is difficult
110

Id. at 2595.
Id. at 2594-96.
112
Id. at 2611 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
113
Id. at 2610. Justice Kagan worries about the inability of local governments and courts
to distinguish a demand from a suggestion, noting:
unless Nollan and Dolan are to wreck land-use permitting throughout the
country—to the detriment of both communities and property owners—
that demand must be unequivocal. If a local government risked a lawsuit
every time it made a suggestion to an applicant about how to meet permitting criteria, it would cease to do so; indeed, the government might
desist altogether from communicating with applicants.
Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2610 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
111
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enough for a court to determine whether an exaction imposed violates
Nollan/Dolan. However, when no exaction has been imposed, the
challenge becomes ever more difficult.
Furthermore, the majority strains the limits of the Nollan/Dolan test by applying it to monetary exactions. In both Nollan
and Dolan, the Court stated that heightened review applied because
the exactions demanded by the government would have constituted
per se takings114 had they been assessed directly.115 Both cases suggest that had the exactions not constituted per se takings, then it
would have been inappropriate to impose the Court’s heightened review.116 However, monetary exactions can never constitute a per se
taking because they do not require a property owner to suffer a permanent physical invasion of his property, nor do they completely deprive an owner of all beneficial use of his property.117 Therefore,
Nollan and Dolan were never meant to apply to monetary exactions.
Justice Kagan recognizes this, writing that “[t]he majority offers no
theory to . . . explain, as it must, why the District’s [monetary] condition was ‘unconstitutional.’ ”118
B.

Koontz Makes an Orderly System of Land Use
Regulation Significantly More Difficult

Conspicuously absent from the majority’s opinion in Koontz
114

See Lingle, 544 U.S. at 547. The Court noted that there are “two categories of regulatory action that generally will be deemed per se takings for Fifth Amendment purposes.
First, where government requires an owner to suffer a permanent physical invasion of her
property,” as in Loretto; and second, when a regulation “completely deprive[s] an owner of
‘all economically beneficial us[e]’ of her property,” as in Lucas. Id. at 538 (alteration in
original).
115
The exaction demanded in Nollan was a public easement along the property owner’s
beachfront property. The exaction demanded in Dolan was the walk/bike path along fifteen
percent of the property owner’s land. Both of these would constitute per se takings under
the Loretto takings test. See Nollan, 483 U.S. at 827-28; Dolan, 512 U.S. at 379-80. See
Lingle, 544 U.S. at 538 (discussing the Loretto takings test).
116
Nollan and Dolan rest on the premise that heightened review is necessary because the
constitutional right to just compensation is burdened by the taking of property. See Nollan,
483 U.S. at 838; Dolan, 512 U.S. at 386. Eastern Enterprises also suggests this. Justice
Kennedy, in a concurring opinion, wrote that “in all of the cases where the regulatory taking[s] analysis has been employed, a specific property right or interest has been at stake.” E.
Enters., 524 U.S. at 541 (Kennedy, J., concurring and dissenting in part).
117
These are the two requirements for a per se taking. See Lingle, 544 U.S. at 538 (discussing the Loretto takings test).
118
Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2607 n.1 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
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was any discussion regarding the practical effects of its decision on
land use regulation. One would expect a decision that rests on such a
shaky legal foundation to at least make good policy, but this too is
lacking in the Koontz decision.
One of the most significant consequences of Koontz will be
the changes it makes to the relationship between local governments
and developers. As part of the development process, local governments frequently meet with developers to discuss the potential negative impacts of development and how the developer might mitigate
them.119 This type of collaboration is essential to an orderly and efficient system of land use regulation.120 Unfortunately, Koontz serves
as a major obstacle to this collaboration.
Koontz makes it significantly easier for developers to drop out
of negotiations and sue the local government over the allegedly “extortionate” demands that it has made during the permitting process.
Koontz itself demonstrates all too clearly how this could happen.
Koontz, upset with the District’s rejection of his development proposal, broke off his negotiations with it and filed suit.121 The dissent
points out that Koontz was in the early stages of the negotiation process122 and that it is unclear whether the “extortionate demands”
made by the District were in fact demands or merely nonbinding proposals.123 In fact, the Court’s refusal to provide standards to distinguish between the two is a serious obstacle to collaboration between
a local government and a developer.
In the back-and-forth process of negotiations over land use
permits, whenever the government makes a request that the developer
does not like, the developer now has the option to drop out of the negotiations and bring a lawsuit against the government for making unconstitutional demands. In order to avoid this lawsuit, local governments will be reluctant to engage in any negotiations with
119
Collaboration between land use owners and developers is an integral part of local government development guides. See, e.g., Thomas P. DiNapoli, Office of the N.Y. State
Comptroller, Shared Services in Local Government, LOCAL GOV’T MGMT GUIDE 3-9 (DEC.
2009), http://www.osc.state.ny.us/localgov/pubs/lgmg/sharedservices.pdf.
120
See Karalee Browne & Steve Sanders, Collaboration Promotes Economic Development and Advances Sustainability, W. CITY (May 2013), http://www.westerncity.com/Weste
rn-City/May-2013/Collaboration-Promotes-Economic-Development/.
121
Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2593.
122
Id. at 2610-11 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
123
Id.
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developers.124 As Justice Kagan noted in her dissent, when faced
with this situation, “no local government official with a decent lawyer would have a conversation with a developer.”125 In order to avoid
the lawsuits resulting from negotiations with developers, local governments are more likely to either deny a permit outright or grant one
without imposing any exactions.126 This is a suboptimal outcome for
both sides.
In addition to discouraging collaboration between developers
and local governments, Koontz will make development more costly.
As noted above, Koontz will almost certainly spawn more litigation
between local governments and developers.127 Fights over development, once waged in local zoning board hearings, will now take place
in federal court, where it will be more expensive and time consuming. Furthermore, Koontz never resolved the issue as to when a local
government’s exactions are “roughly proportional” to its demands.
Litigation will surely arise to determine the boundaries of this standard.
Another problem with the Koontz decision is that it takes
power away from communities and puts it into the hands of federal
judges. As developers can now bypass zoning boards and contest a
land use decision in federal court, federal judges, often unfamiliar
with the land use negotiation process and unaware of local conditions, will be making important land use decisions previously made
by local zoning boards comprised of elected community representatives.128
Additionally, the majority in Koontz was concerned about local governments extracting concessions from developers. Yet, its
124
Sacramento Bee Editorial Board, Court Ruling a Blow to Land Use Collaboration,
SACRAMENTO BEE (June 27, 2013), blogs.sacbee.com/capitol-alert-insider-edition/2013/06/e
ditorial-court-ruling-a-blow-to-land-use-collaboration.html. See also Sean F. Nolan, Bargaining for Development Post-Koontz: How the Supreme Court Invaded Local Government,
VT. L. SCH. (discussing how the ruling in Koontz makes land use negotiations less efficient).
125
Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2610 (Kagan, J., dissenting). Justice Kagan worries about the
consequences of the majority’s decision on collaboration between local governments and
developers, noting that “[i]f a local government risked a lawsuit every time it made a suggestion to an applicant about how to meet permitting criteria, it would cease to do so; indeed,
the government might desist altogether from communicating with applicants.” Id.
126
Id.
127
Id. at 2611-12.
128
Id. at 2612 (“The majority turns a broad array of local land-use regulations into federal
constitutional questions. . . . [P]lac[ing] courts smack in the middle of the most everyday
local government activity.”).
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holding makes it easier for developers to extract concessions from local governments. Developers, who are generally multi-million dollar
entities capable of providing the investment and infrastructure that
are the lifeblood of communities,129 already carry significant leverage
in their negotiations with local governments.130 Making it easier for
them to bring a lawsuit against financially-strained local governments
only increases their power at the bargaining table and their ability to
extract concessions from communities.
Furthermore, the majority’s casual dismissal of the difficulties
involved in distinguishing a monetary exaction from a tax ignores the
realities faced by local governments. Is it really so easy to distinguish a monetary exaction levied in exchange for a building permit
from a tax on all new houses to be built in a community? As Justice
Kagan notes, lower courts have been all over the map on “how to
make the distinction”131 between an exaction and a property tax. In
fact, the majority’s inability to articulate a clear standard to distinguish the two shows the difficulty in doing so.
Ultimately, Koontz creates a new paradigm in the relationship
between local governments and developers. Koontz gives developers
special protections that local governments and taxpayers currently
lack. In this new world, local governments must avoid falling into
traps that will subject them to litigation or allow developers the upper-hand in the negotiating process.
V.

HOW DO LOCAL GOVERNMENTS PROCEED IN THE POST KOONTZ WORLD?

In the aftermath of Koontz, local governments must be extracautious when negotiating with developers. Specifically, they must
avoid certain actions that may bring about a lawsuit.
First, when negotiating with developers, local governments
must make clear that their discussions are exploratory only, that no
demands are being made, and that the city council or zoning board
129

See Browne & Sanders, supra note 120 (“cities are working to attract business investments that will bring jobs, skilled workers and new tax revenue. . . . [C]ompetition to attract
employers can be fierce.”).
130
See id. (“[C]ompetition between neighboring cities and counties [for developers] . . .
pits communities against one another . . . .”). This gives developers significant leverage in
negotiations with cities.
131
Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2607- 08 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
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are the only entities authorized to formally approve any conditions
necessary to obtain a permit. As explained above, it is unclear what
constitutes a demand that might give rise to a Koontz-style takings
claim.132 However, it should be clear that a takings claim cannot proceed until a demand is made. By making it clear at the outset that
any discussions with a developer are exploratory only and that no
formal demands are being made, a local government may be able to
prevent this type of lawsuit from being initiated. Furthermore, a local
government must carefully craft a record to show its negotiations
were exploratory only and not formal demands.
Second, local governments should make greater use of development agreements. A development agreement is a contract between
a developer and a local government specifying the terms of the development133 and can be beneficial for both parties.134 For example, a
local government can specify the exactions it will require from the
developer, while the developer can freeze zoning laws, obtain support
during the development process, and streamline the approval of permits.135 As part of the agreement, the developer and the local government can also immunize each other from liability during the negotiation process.
The use of a voluntary development agreement to set the
terms and conditions of development of a particular property should
reduce the likelihood of a Koontz challenge and help ensure a dialogue between a local government and a developer. A number of
states have statutes enabling local governments to enter into development agreements,136 and courts have been willing to uphold
132

See Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2494-96 (majority opinion) (stating that “[t]he Florida Supreme Court [was] puzzled over how the government’s demand for property can violate the
Takings Clause . . . .”).
133
Development Agreements in Plain English, MUN. RESEARCH & SERV. CTR. OF WASH.,
available at http://www.mrsc.org/subjects/planning/lu/developagreements.aspx (last visited
Mar. 31, 2014); CALLIES, BARCLAY, & TAPPENDORF, supra note 19.
134
For a detailed explanation of development agreements, see Development Agreements
in Plain English, MUN. RESEARCH & SERV. CTR. OF WASH., available at
http://www.mrsc.org/subjects/planning/lu/developagreements.aspx (last visited Mar. 31,
2014), and DAVID L. CALLIES, DANIEL J. CURTIN, & JULIE A. TAPPENDORF, BARGAINING FOR
DEVELOPMENT: A HANDBOOK ON DEVELOPMENT AGREEMENTS, ANNEXATION AGREEMENTS,
LAND DEVELOPMENT CONDITIONS, VESTED RIGHTS, AND THE PROVISION OF PUBLIC FACILITIES
(2003).
135
See Brad K. Schwartz, Development Agreements: Contracting for Vested Rights, 28
B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 719, 726-27 (2001).
136
See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9-500.05; CAL. GOV’T CODE §§ 65864-65869; COLO.
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them.137 However, a local government must avoid mandating the use
of these agreements. While development agreements can be an effective way to ensure that development in fact occurs and is done fairly,
any conditions set forth in a mandatory development agreement could
be construed as demands subject to the heightened scrutiny of Nollan/Dolan.138 However, as long as entering into a development
agreement is voluntary, conditions of the agreement will probably not
be held as demands.139
Third, a local government must make a developmental impact
fee seem different from an individualized assessment on property.
The more an impact fee appears to be directed toward a specific
property, the more likely that the court will determine it to be a
monetary exaction subject to the heightened standards of Nollan/Dolan.140 Because of the potential for a particular fee or exaction
being considered an exaction subject to Nollan/Dolan, some communities already go through the analysis of applying the takings tests to
all new impact fees prior to imposing them. That approach may be
broader than necessary in most cases, but should discourage a develREV. STAT. ANN. §§ 24-68-101-24-68-106; FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 163.3220-163.3243; HAW.
REV. STAT. §§ 46-121-46-132; IDAHO CODE § 67-6511A; LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33:4780.22;
NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 278.0201; VA. CODE ANN. § 15.2-2303.1; N.J. STAT. ANN. 40:55D45.2; MD. ANN. CODE §§ 24-301-24-311; WASH. REV. CODE §§ 36.70B.170-36.70B.210;
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 30-A, § 4352(8) (allowing, in Maine, “contract zoning” agreements”).
137
See Meredith v. Talbot Cnty., 560 A.2d 599, 604 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1989) (holding
that the developer was bound by the development agreement and could not invalidate it under a claim of duress, because the developer made a “reasonable and informed business decision” which conferred benefits upon all the parties).
138
See Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2603 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (noting that while it is not clear
what actually constitutes a demand, a mandatory development agreement would force developers to abide by the conditions of the agreement, which a court would likely construe as
demands tied to the receipt of a permit and, therefore, subject to the Nollan/Dolan requirements).
139
See Leroy Land Dev. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 939 F.2d 696, 698-99 (9th Cir.
1991) (holding that the takings analysis of Nollan/Dolan did not apply because the parties
chose to execute a development agreement supported by consideration). The court noted
that “[s]uch a contractual promise which operates to restrict a property owner’s use of land
cannot result in a ‘taking’ because the promise is entered into voluntarily, in good faith and
is supported by consideration.” Id. The voluntary nature of the development agreement
suggests that developers have negotiated a deal with a local government and are not having
their land taken. Id.
140
Dolan, 512 U.S. at 391 (stating that the “rough proportionality” test applies to “individualized determination[s]” made by the local government on property). The more a fee is
tied to a specific property, the more likely it will be construed as an “individualized determination,” and subject to the Nollan/Dolan standards.
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oper from bringing suit against a local government, and provide support to a local government if a lawsuit is filed to challenge the fee.
Fourth, most commentators interpret Koontz to apply only to
exactions imposed on a particular project, not to fees and exactions
imposed through legislation. A local government may be able to circumvent the heightened standards of Nollan/Dolan by imposing impact fees and exactions through legislation, as these fees appear to be
governed by the more deferential standard of Penn Central.141
VI.

CONCLUSION

The doctrine of unconstitutional conditions has become an integral part of American constitutional law, evolving over the course
of a century to become an important guarantor of rights. The doctrine has come to play a crucial role in the Court’s exactions jurisprudence, a controversial and changing area of law. Developed largely
in three landmark cases over the past three decades, the Court’s exactions jurisprudence has become muddied by Koontz.
Koontz raises many questions and answers few, and puts a
veil of uncertainty over formerly clear standards. One consequence
of the decision that is clear, however, is that collaboration between
local governments and developers will become more difficult. Fearful of lawsuits, local governments may be reluctant to negotiate with
developers. Emboldened by Koontz, developers may hold the threat
of a lawsuit over local governments to extract conditions favorable to
them. Local governments and courts will struggle to determine the
difference between a monetary exaction and a tax.
In this new world, local governments must proceed with extra
caution. Although they can continue to negotiate with developers,
they must take pains to create a record that shows they did not make
demands, but rather engaged in an informal dialogue. Local governments should consider making greater use of development agreements, which might immunize them from liability during the negotiation process and rebuild some of the trust lost in the wake of Koontz.
With its indifference to practical realities, Koontz is reminiscent of a
141
See id. (recognizing that the “rough proportionality” test applies to “individualized determinations” made by the local government on property). Since legislation cannot be an
individualized determination, it would seem that Nollan/Dolan does not apply to it; therefore, Penn Central, which governs most regulatory takings, is the standard that would apply.
Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
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Lochner Court decision, the Court that created the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions, which some regard as one of the worst in
American history.142

142

See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 14
(1980) (noting that the Lochner Court decisions are “now universally acknowledged to have
been constitutionally improper . . . .”).

Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2014

23

